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One fundamental issue with existing reputation systems, particularly those implemented in open and decen-
tralized environments, is whitewashing attacks by opportunistic participants. If identities are cheap, it is beneficial
for a rational provider to simply defect when selling services to its clients, leave the system to avoid punishment and
then rejoin with a new identity. Current work usually assumes the existence of an effective identity management
scheme to avoid the problem, without proposing concrete solutions to directly prevent this unwanted behavior.
This article presents and analyzes an incentive mechanism to effectively motivate honesty of rationally oppor-
tunistic providers in the aforementioned scenario, by eliminating incentives of providers to change their identities.
The main idea is to give each provider an identity premium, with which the provider may sell services at higher
prices depending on the duration of its presence in the system. Our price-based incentive mechanism, implemented
with the use of a reputation-based provider selection protocol and a reverse auction scheme, is shown to signif-
icantly reduce the impact of malicious and strategic ratings, while still allowing explicit competition among the
providers. It is proven that if the temporary cheating gain by a provider is bounded and small and given a trust
model with a reasonable low error bound in identifying malicious ratings, our approach can effectively eliminate
irrationally malicious providers and enforce honest behavior of rationally opportunistic ones, even when cheap
identities are available. We suggest an identity premium function that helps such honesty to be sustained given
a certain cost of identities and analyze incentives of participants in accepting the proposed premium. Related
implementation issues in different application scenarios are also discussed.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Reputation systems have been shown to be effective in enforcing honesty and facilitat-
ing trustworthy behavior in a variety of practical application scenarios. Prominent examples
of these systems include business applications such as eBay, peer-to-peer (P2P) content
provisioning systems, service marketplaces, and social recommender systems, to name
just a few. The effectiveness of a reputation mechanism in enforcing truthful behavior
is due to its capability to detect and punish individuals with bad intentions (malicious
and uncooperative), as such bad behavior results in low reputation as perceived by
the community.
Pseudonyms such as nicknames are usually used to identify the participants in
reputation-based systems. Generally, these pseudonyms are disassociated from real-life
identities as a form of protecting the anonymity and privacy of the participating users. As a
result, it is relatively easy for users to acquire and change their identities at a low cost. On
the one hand, this disassociation is a must to facilitate interactions in online environments
(Friedman and Resnick 2001). On the other hand, it becomes possible for any (intelligent
yet malicious) participants to whitewash their bad reputation and thereby effectively avoid
punishment of the community after defection. This whitewashing issue is a fundamental
problem in any reputation system: It is the main source of several attacks and vulnerabilities
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(Hoffman, Zage, and Nita-Rotaru 2009). Marti and Garcia-Molina (2003) show via
empirical simulation that the effectiveness of a reputation system compared to systems
without any reputation mechanism varies largely depending on whether the system uses an
easy-to-defect account registration (thus whitewashing bad behavior is simple) to a hard-to-
change account management scheme with permanent identifiers for users. The famous Sybil
attack (Douceur 2002) is also related to the problem of easy-to-change and cheap identities.
While the rich literature on trust management provides us with valuable insights into the
development of incentive mechanisms to enforce honesty in decentralized systems, there is
little analysis on how to combat the problem of cheap pseudonyms and the whitewashing
of bad behavior. Most work on trust and reputation models (implicitly) assume an underly-
ing identity management infrastructure that handles the cheap pseudonym issue effectively
and efficiently. Interested readers may want to refer to existing surveys to have a better view
of the area (Despotovic and Aberer 2006; Golbeck 2006; Jøsang, Ismail, and Boyd 2007;
Hoffman et al. 2009). In this work, we propose a dynamic pricing mechanism to create eco-
nomic incentives for rationally opportunistic providers to stay in the system and use the
same identity throughout their lifetime, thereby effectively preventing their whitewashing
behavior. Identities can still be easy to create, and no costly identity management approach
is needed. Our solution is applicable in rational environments with opportunistic partici-
pants behaving strategically to maximize their expected lifetime utilities. We also assume
the existence of a few irrationally malicious providers whose goal is to attack the system at
any cost.
Our incentive mechanism is designed as a protocol for a rational client to select the
most eligible provider for a transaction. First, those providers offering services matching
the client’s requirements are checked if they ever defected in their most recent transactions.
Specifically, the reliability of the most recent rating on each eligible provider is evaluated to
determine whether the provider defected in the last transaction with a previous client. Well-
experimented (reputation-based) computational trust models, e.g., those presented by Xiong
and Liu (2004) and Teacy et al. (2005) can be used for this purpose. The evaluation of the
last rating’s reliability decides whether the provider is included for selection or blacklisted
by the client. Interestingly, the consideration of only the most recent rating gives sufficient
incentives for rational providers to cooperate in most of their transactions. It is proven that
the protocol also helps to reduce the negative influence of the intentionally malicious partic-
ipants if the dishonesty detector is accurate in identifying the unreliable and biased ratings.
Second, those providers passing the evaluation are invited to participate in an anonymous
reverse auction. The goal of the auction is to promote competition among providers and to
discover the true price of the service. The auction winner, i.e., the one offering the lowest
price, will be selected by the client for the next transaction with one important adjustment:
The final price the client pays is determined based on the auction-winning price adjusted
with the provider’s identity premium. This identity premium is a function of the number
of transactions associated with the provider’s identifier and assures that well-established
providers with good reputation will have a strong advantage against newcomers in terms
of pricing their services even in competitive scenarios. Such an identity premium concept
corresponds to what actually happens in practical business environments. As an example, a
previous study (Resnick et al. 2006) shows that buyers on eBay are willing to pay more than
8.1% the usual price to popular and reputable sellers. With the identity premium-based pric-
ing model, any rational provider is given strong incentives to cooperate in all but its very
last transaction, despite the fact that cheap identities may be available.
Our proposed approach can be applied in various online reputation-based market-
places with different degrees of centralization. Note that although most other systems use
reputation information to determine a trustworthy provider in terms of providing service, we
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use reputation to evaluate the trustworthiness of both the provider and the related services.
As a result, this work provides the following contributions to the trust and reputation
research community:
 We propose the use of identity premium as a way to provide strong honesty incen-
tives for providers in open and decentralized environments with rational participants and
cheap identities. We prove that an identity premium-based pricing model helps to ensure
honesty from any rational provider in all but its very last transaction, and thereby, the
incentive of a provider to change its identity is effectively eliminated.
 We identify and analyze the relation among the effectiveness of the reputation-based
computational trust model, the service pricing model, the cost of identities and the
provider’s incentive of honesty. This contribution is significant because it provides funda-
mental understanding on the extent to which a computational trust model can eliminate
the intentionally malicious providers and enforce honesty of the rational ones, even when
cheap pseudonyms are available.
 We analyze the incentives of providers and clients in accepting the proposed model
via the analysis of a system using such an identity premium concept. We then identify
those constraints and scenarios where such mechanisms are still beneficial and accept-
able to clients and providers, depending on the application domain. We show that in any
application, the problem of cheap identities can be solved if, in each transaction, the
additional gain of a provider by cheating is limited. Even with the asymmetry of infor-
mation between providers and clients, using an identity premium-based pricing model
only causes bounded reduction in revenue to any long-staying provider compared to an
ideal system; thus, it is still acceptable to them. Considering risks, our provider selection
approach is preferable for clients compared to a system without any identity premium
and where whitewashing attacks are likely to happen. Different possible approaches to
implement such identity premium for providers are also discussed.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the related
work. We present the system model and introduce the basic concepts in Section 3. Section 4
presents in detail our proposed approach and the corresponding analysis on the effectiveness
of the solution. In Section 5, some issues on the implementation of the identity premium
approach are discussed. We finally conclude the article and propose future work in Section 6.
2. RELATEDWORK
Existing solutions to the problem of cheap pseudonym and whitewashing behaviors are
usually based on the principle of imposing a high entrance cost to the system. Among them,
one possible implementation is to use strong, verifiable pseudonyms linked to real-world
identities, thereby making it more difficult for users to switch their identities. For example,
credit card numbers or physical mailing addresses are required in some online auction sites,
such as ebay.com or ricardo.ch, as a way to ensure that each person can open only one
single account. Another alternative is to require any newcomer to pay a monetary fee when
joining the system. These solutions can be effective in preventing whitewashing in small-
scale, centralized systems but are very difficult to implement in a decentralized environment
without any centralized authority. First, difficult-to-create identities and entrance cost may
defer users’ participation. It is also not trivial to implement the payment mechanism fairly
in a decentralized setting, e.g., it is not easy to determine to whom newly joined participants
should pay their entrance cost. Second, potential privacy leakage and anonymity breaches
make the use of real-life identities in online systems very difficult, if not impossible.
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Other works also propose to assign a low initial reputation value to a new user to prevent
similar re-entry problems, namely Kerr and Cohen (2010). In these works, the value of a
high reputation is not studied explicitly in relation with the economic incentive of honesty of
the rational participants. They also do not provide a detailed analysis and quantification of
the extent to which such mechanisms limit the whitewashing intention of the opportunistic
service providers. Furthermore, new users with low reputation values will have little chance
to do business, and as a result, it is difficult for them to build up their reputation. These
solutions can be used as complementary to our identity premium approach. They allow
users to see whether the low reputation of a provider is due to the fact that many of their
interactions ended badly or to the fact that they are new to the system. Thus, with the use
of an identity premium, newly joined providers may sell their services at a potentially lower
initial revenue and have the potential to build up their reputation.
Particularly, an early work addressing the issue of whitewashing behavior in reputa-
tion systems is presented by Feldman et al. (2004a, 2006), where adaptive stranger policies
are used to treat newcomers depending on the behaviors of the past newcomers. Experi-
ments showed that adaptive stranger policies work well with a reasonably small turnover
rate of the users. This work is still preliminary because only simulation results on a simple
P2P file-sharing system are presented, without any further theoretical analysis and gener-
alization for similar environments. Implementation of the preceding approach in a general
open and decentralized system is unfortunately difficult, because building an effective adap-
tive stranger policy, as shown by Feldman et al. (2004a, 2006), requires a reasonably good
estimate of the number of real newcomers and whitewashing malicious providers. Further-
more, in more critical business applications, newcomers should be treated more carefully,
and defecting has more serious effects and thus is less tolerant to the system’s reputation.
Feldman et al. (2004b) estimate the negative impact of whitewashers in a simulated P2P
file system and conclude that by imposing penalties on all newcomers, whitewashers can be
prevented. Our work can be seen as a possible decentralized implementation of the punish-
ment for newcomers, and we have treated the subject more extensively by considering the
impact of the computational trust model being used by the system, the identity cost of the
participants and the temporary cheating gain to the incentives for the rational providers to
behave honestly.
Other potential approaches to deal with the easy-to-change identity problem are related
to research efforts in entity resolution in the database research community (Shen, Li, and
Doan 2005). The goal of these works is to identify whether many virtual pseudonyms refer
to the same real person; thus, fake identities can be detected and eliminated. Sybil-proof
reputation mechanisms (Yu et al. 2006; Resnick and Sami 2009), which aim to detect iden-
tities of malicious users by investigating the structure of social links between the Sybils and
honest users also help to prevent whitewashing behavior to a large extent. These approaches
implicitly assume that the new participants expend a certain cost to build relationships with
existing entities in the system. This is different from our approach, which considers a variety
of scenarios where the identity cost may vary.
In the economics literature, there are several studies on the empirical phenomenon of
premium. Most of these works present online field experiments showing the existence of
reputation premium in a variety of marketplaces, e.g., in Bordeaux’s wine market (Landon
and Smith 1998) and on auction sites such as eBay (Standifird 2001; Pavlou 2002; Ghose,
Ipeirotis, and Sundararajan 2009). Among them, the work most related to ours is that of
Shapiro (1983), in which the authors quantify the premium that must be levied from sell-
ers to enforce trustworthy behavior and avoid the case of zero-cost identities. However, no
detailed analysis of the case of noisy evaluation and possible malicious behaviors is given.
Our analysis is also more general, as we study the case of identities with small nonzero cost
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more explicitly and also suggest possible ways to implement such an identity premium in
different application scenarios.
Our work can also be seen as a simple way of using reputation information to improve
the trustworthiness of participants in online auctions. Thus, this work is in some way
related to existing studies on the best use of trust and reputation information to improve the
efficiency and tackle trusting issues in electronic negotiations (König et al. 2008).
3. SYSTEMMODEL
We consider a network of autonomous and intelligent agents participating in an online
marketplace of services with the following operational constraints:
 Each agent has a public identity and can be a provider and/or client of a (possibly infinite)
number of services. Agents may change their identities freely and inexpensively, i.e., an
identity can be bought at a small cost   0.
 The system may be decentralized, yet there is a secure (decentralized) storage system
that enables the reliable sharing of information among the agents, e.g., a storage system
implemented on top of a distributed hash table (Aberer et al. 2003). Thus, we assume the
existence of a shared public space implemented on top of the distributed storage layer
for easy information sharing between any two agents.
 A provider sells its services, each at a prescribed quality level q 2 Q. If the provider
claims to provide a service at a quality level q, with a price uq , yet actually delivers it
at a lower quality level q0 < q, the provider is said to have defected. In that case, the
provider has an additional illegitimate gain vqq0 due to its cost saving when delivering
the lower-quality service. If q0 D q; vqq D 0, i.e., the provider is said to be cooperative
or honest. The temporary cheating gain is a function v W Q  Q 7! Œ0; v bounded by
some v > 0. In this work, we only consider the most relevant case where the temporary
cheating gain by a provider in a transaction is at most the price of the offered service,
i.e., vqq0  v  uq . As the provider spends less to provide lower-quality services, vqq0
is a monotonically decreasing function of q0. Therefore, a provider has incentive to offer
services at a quality lower than it promises, i.e., to defect when providing the services.
In this article, we consider the case of two quality levels (good and bad), for which the
index q is skipped and the service price is usually denoted as u. Similarly, we use v
instead of vqq0 for the enhanced readability of the article and assume that v D u, where
0    1 is the temporary cheating gain ratio of a provider.
 After using the service, the client posts a binary rating on the quality of the transaction
with the service provider. The ratings can be stored locally or globally, and any rating
can be retrieved and verified to be authentic by any other agent in the system, e.g., by
using existing cryptographical methods such as digital signatures and digest hashes. For
a given service, the transaction is considered as good (or +) if and only if (iff) the client
perceives the service quality as good as it expects. Contrarily, the transaction is evaluated
as bad (or ) by the client iff the service quality is lower than what was promised by the
provider. With our incentive mechanism, this binary rating system turns out to be able to
enforce honesty of providers at the highest possible extent.
 We consider the case where most providers are rationally opportunistic in economic
terms, i.e., they want to maximize their expected lifetime utilities by behaving strategi-
cally in each transaction. A few providers are intentionally (irrationally) malicious and
want to attack the system at any cost by defecting when delivering their services or by
posting dishonest and biased ratings on their allies and competitors.
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The preceding abstract model represents many reputation-based online marketplaces
with different degrees of centralization. Such a model can represent, for instance, a central-
ized eBay-like auction site, a commercial trading system implemented on top of an online
social network or a decentralized market of computational or storage services (Buyya et al.
2001; Papazoglou and Georgakopoulos 2003). Consequently, our proposed solution can be
used in all these applications.
4. SOLUTION FRAMEWORK
4.1. Fundamental Concepts
We suppose that each agent in the system uses a (reputation-based) computational trust
model to evaluate the credibility of a rating on a provider with a certain error rate. Thus, a
client uses the trust management mechanism as a dishonesty detector to identify potentially
malicious ratings, and to select a reliable provider for its future transactions (Definition 1).
Note that in any reputation system, a provider may collude with some clients to create fake
transactions to build up its reputation. Those ratings related to the fake transactions are also
considered malicious by our definition, and therefore, the detection of them is also a part of
the computation trust model mechanism.
Definition 1. A dishonesty detectorR is a computational trust model that evaluates a rating
as reliable or unreliable, using as input historical performance statistics of the provider, the
rater and the other related agents. The detection procedure is verifiable by any agent.
The following statistical accuracy measures of a dishonesty detector, as presented in
Definition 2, are of our interest.
Definition 2. We define the accuracy of a dishonesty detector R in estimating the
reliability of a rating as the maximum misclassification error ", where 0 < " < 1
and " is common knowledge. " is the upper bound for the actual misclassification
rates ˛ and ˇ of the detector R, corresponding to false positives and false negatives,
i.e., ˛ D Pr.rating estimated as reliable byR j rating is actually unreliable/ and ˇ D
Pr.rating estimated as unreliable byR j rating is actually reliable/.
The accuracy, or misclassification error bound, of a dishonesty detector also implies
its resilience to possible malicious attacks from intelligent agents that manipulate ratings
on their competitors and alliance. To be accurate, the computational trust model should
consider the performance statistics of both the rater and the provider when estimating the
reliability of a rating. Note that the actual value of ˛ and ˇ of a dishonesty detector may
change (possibly improve) over time, depending on the learning capability of the detection
algorithm. It is only necessary that the upper bound " of the misclassification errors of
the dishonesty detection be known and used as common knowledge in the system. This
upper bound may be estimated through simulation-based or real-life experimentation as
the prediction accuracy of the computational trust model in the presence of different types
of misbehavior.
In this article, we assume the existence of a computational trust model as an effective
dishonesty detector with a reasonable error bound 0 < " < 0:5, irrespective of the possible
manipulation of ratings by the participants. A detailed implementation and analysis of such
an evaluation mechanism are not the focus of this article. However, we believe such an
assumption is realistic owing to the following reasons:
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 An adversary may control a part but not all inputs to the dishonesty detection mechanism,
e.g., a provider may collude with up to a certain percentage of the clients; thus, in general,
the adversary does not have strong influence on the detection error bound. This is also
true because the detection algorithm can be open but its specific setting can be kept
secret before the evaluation, and thus, gaming of the result by the involved agents can
be avoided.
 Given a certain number of known (malicious) attack models and with the given lim-
itation in the capability of the adversary, the designer can always come up with a
sophisticated detection mechanism to detect these attacks and eliminate bogus ratings
effectively.
 In real life, out-of-band monitoring and investigation mechanisms can also be used to
learn the truthful outcome of a transaction with high accuracy, even though such an
approach can be costly. Many existing reputation-based trust models in the literature
can also be used to implement such a dishonesty detector with very high accuracy, as
explained in detail in Section 5.2.
We propose the following procedure for a service client to select the most suitable
provider among the eligible ones given their reputation, as summarized in Figure 1. First,
any provider s offering a service matching the client’s requirements will be checked to deter-
mine whether it is blacklisted by at least k peers. If not, then the provider will be checked
to determine whether it defected in its most recent transaction. Definition 3 gives details of
this evaluation. The providers passing this evaluation are then invited to participate anony-
mously in an online reverse auction to compete for the right to sell service to the client.
Specifically, these providers will place their bid for the lowest service price they are willing
FIGURE 1. Different steps of selecting a reputable provider for the next transaction by a service client.
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to accept. The identities of the participants are hidden from each other. Such an anonymous
auction promotes competition among providers and helps to discover the true price of the
service (Schoenherr and Mabert 2007). The identity sp of the auction winner, i.e., the one
offering the lowest price, and its offering service price u will be revealed after the auction.
The final price the client pays for the selected provider sp is then determined based on the
auction-winning price u adjusted with the identity premium of the winner. The identity pre-
mium of a provider is determined by the number of transactions it has finished in the system
with its current identity (to be explained further in Section 4.3). The key idea is to give rep-
utable providers a strong advantage against newcomers in terms of pricing their services,
even in competitive scenarios. It is therefore beneficial for the provider to keep the same
identity for future transactions during its stay in the system.
Definition 3. A client evaluates the eligibility of a provider with the following provider
selection protocol Sk D hR; ki:
(1) It retrieves the most recent binary rating r 2 ¹C;º on the provider, considering the
absence of a rating as the presence of a positive rating.
(2) The binary reliabilitybt 2 ¹reliable; unreliableº of r is evaluated with the dishonesty
detectorR.
(3) if .bt D reliable ^ r D / _ .bt D unreliable ^ r D C/, the client publishes this infor-
mation (a detection of the most recent cheating by the provider) to the public storage
space (a global blacklist).
(4) The provider is invited to the auctioning step if in the publicly shared space there are
less than k  1 published cheating detections on the provider regarding its most recent
transaction. Otherwise, the client blacklists this provider.
Essentially, Definition 3 specifies that for the selection of a provider, only the last inter-
action (from any client) with that provider is taken into consideration, and each client makes
its own selection decision based on the outcome of the feedback on that last interaction.
Note that the client may play the role of the auctioneer to choose the provider if required,
e.g., in a fully decentralized system.
Figure 1 shows the step-by-step illustration of the aforementioned provider selection
protocol. Such a protocol is tough for bad providers, including malicious and rationally
opportunistic ones. It assures that a globally blacklisted provider has to quit the system
and joins in with a new identity if ever wanting to sell its services again. The reverse-
auction controller and the trust management mechanism (i.e., the dishonesty detector) can
be implemented as a centralized entity or in a decentralized way at each client depending on
the degree of centralization of the system.
The evaluation of rating reliability by a dishonesty detector in step (2) of Definition 3
helps reduce the influences of strategic rating manipulation by rational or malicious agents.
The goal here is to eliminate as many malicious providers as possible when they start cheat-
ing and incentivize rationally opportunistic providers to cooperate. Actually, the use of the
preceding selection protocol with a global computational trust model mimics the behavior
of a centralized reputation system in practice. The parameter k  1 represents the cau-
tiousness of a client in trusting cheating detections published by others. For easy reference,
Table 1 summarizes the most frequently used notations in this article.
4.2. Scope of Our Analysis
To reduce the complexity of the analysis and the presentation clarity without reducing
the applicability of the approach, we do not consider the following issues in our analysis.
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TABLE 1. Notations.
Notation Definition
u Minimal price of offered services, u > 0
u Maximal price of offered services, u  u
u The service price proposed by the reverse-auction winner, u  u  u
v The cheating gain of provider if it defects, 0  v  u
ui (or vi ) Similar to u (or v) but considered in the context of the i-th transaction
 The cost to create a new identity
0 The minimal identity cost .1  / to enforce honesty of providers
 The ratio vi=ui (or v=u)
R A dishonesty detector to estimate reliability of a rating, as explained in Definition 1
˛ Pr(rating estimated as reliable j rating is actually unreliable)
ˇ Pr(rating estimated as unreliable j rating is actually reliable)
" Upper bound of ˛ and ˇ, 0 < " < 0:5
k No. of reports of a provider cheating, before it is globally blacklisted by clients
 The relative cheating gain ratio =..1  "/k  "k/
Sk D hR; ki A provider selection protocol specified in Definition 3
 No. of the remaining services of a provider
 A parameter determining the initial price of a service, 0 <  < 1, potentially with
index i referring to a certain service in the i-th transaction of a provider
These issues are either orthogonal to the current problem or can be readily resolved with
existing known solutions.
First, we do not directly consider the incentives of the clients to leave a rating after
a transaction. Intuitively, the clients have indirect incentives to leave reliable ratings after
transactions because this helps to eliminate bad providers. Also, it is possible to integrate
existing incentive mechanisms, e.g., via side payment (Miller, Resnick, and Zeckhauser
2005; Zhang, Cohen, and Larson 2012), to motivate the clients to leave honest feedback
after their transactions. Furthermore, the absence of a rating after a transaction is considered
as the presence of a positive rating; thus, appropriate decisions can still be made even in
case few ratings are available.
Similarly, providing incentives to share the result of the learning step (the evaluation
of the rating reliability) is an orthogonal issue to the current analysis. This issue is in fact
less relevant: In case the others do not share their detection results, a client can still do
the detection by itself. As the learning at step (2) of Definition 3 is verifiable, (malicious)
writing of wrong learning results is detectable and not an issue. With k D 1, we even do not
need the condition thatR is verifiable as in Definition 1.
One possible problem with the protocol in Definition 3 is the potential badmouthing
attack, when many agents collude to badmouth a certain provider. To reduce the effect of
this attack and potential observation noise, a robust detection algorithm R should be used
to consider the trustworthiness of both the rater and the provider when estimating whether
a rating is reliable. As we will analyze, the accidental blacklisting of a good provider is of
no harm to a buyer. Even if it may cause certain harm to a provider, such mistakes can be
reduced by both increasing k and lowering the error bound of the second step by using a
more expensive and sophisticated trust model. Designing such an accurate computational
trust model is, however, not the focus of this article.
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4.3. Honesty Enforcement with Cheap Identities
We proved in an early work (Vu and Aberer 2011) that if identities are costly, the selec-
tion protocol in Definition 3 assures that any rational provider is motivated to cooperate in
all but a small number v of its last transactions. This v is dependent on the misclassi-
fication error bound " of the trust mechanism being used in the system to detect malicious
ratings and the bound v of the temporary cheating gain of a provider after a transaction.
The main goal of this article is to develop an approach to enforce honesty even if
identities are cheap. Our proposed solution is to use an identity premium (Definition 4)
to determine the price of a service. This premium allows a provider to sell its services
at higher prices depending on the number of transactions it has completed in the system
with the current identity. Under this pricing scheme, an initially cheap pseudonym would
have an increasingly significant value over time, thereby effectively eliminating the incen-
tive of switching identities and whitewashing bad behavior of any opportunistic provider.
As a result, almost full honesty is the best response strategy of any rational provider when
participating in a transaction.
Definition 4. A provider agent that has finished L > 0 transactions using a given identity
has a monotonically increasing identity premium f .L/ associated with that identity, where
f .0/ D 0. That is, consider a service with a base price u  u  u (u is the winning price
of the reverse auction in Figure 1). A client pays the provider with the final price P.; f /,
where
P.; f / D u.1  / C f .L/ (1)
The price at no identity premium, i.e., with f .0/ D 0, is determined by a parameter 0 <
 < 1, possibly depending on the base price u.
The parameter  is set individually by each client in the system and determines the price
that a newly joined provider can charge, so that this new provider has to sell its services
with lower prices at the beginning. Introducing the parameter  also offers the flexibility
of setting higher prices by the identity premium for a provider staying in the system and
behaving honestly for many transactions. The lower prices at the beginning thus will be
compensated by the higher prices later on. Conditions of this parameter will be investigated
in Theorem 1. The parameter  also provides the flexibility for system designers to minimize
system inefficiency such that both providers and clients are willing to accept our identity
premium-based approach (see further analysis in Sections 4.4 and 4.5).
According to Definition 4, a client agrees to pay a provider having completed many
transactions with a higher price. This price premium is built on the proven track record of
the provider and thus closely related to the reputation score of the provider. The reason we
chose the number of transactions L associated with an identity to determine the premium is
its verifiability. On the other hand, it is nontrivial to estimate the reliability of a reputation
value: Reputation may be estimated in a personalized manner and subject to various strategic
manipulation by intelligent agents. An identity premium can be implemented in different
ways, as discussed later in Section 5.
In this section, we will study the properties of the identity premium function f .L/ to
achieve the highest possible honesty from the opportunistic service providers in relation
with the identity cost  and under the presence of strategic or malicious manipulation of
ratings by competing providers.
Apparently, under the pricing scheme P.; f /, a newly joined provider must sell a
service at price u.1  /, lower than the base price u of the service. A provider staying
in the system for many transactions may sell services at higher prices in later transactions.
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Therefore, staying in the system with the same identity helps the provider to compensate its
loss during earlier transactions where it has zero or small identity premium. Therefore, even
if establishing new identities is relatively cheap, it is expected that every rational provider
finds it optimal to keep the same identity for the whole lifetime rather than cheating, leaving
and joining with a new identity. In other words, whitewashing is not optimal for any rational
provider.
Recall the temporary cheating gain when a rational provider sells a service of any price
u as u, where 0 <   1 (Section 3). For presentation clarification, denote  D 
.1"/k"k .
For simplicity, we call  the the relative cheating gain ratio of a provider in a system with
a given dishonesty detection capability ". Given a bound " for ˛ and ˇ of the dishonesty
detector being used by peers in the system, Theorem 1 shows the relation between the error
bound ", the identity cost  , the identity premium function f .L/ and their effectiveness
in enforcing the honesty of a provider during its lifetime in the case with possible cheap
pseudonyms. The proof is available in the Appendix of this article.
Theorem 1. Assume that every client uses the protocol Sk D hR; ki, where the dishonesty
detector R has the misclassification errors ˛ and ˇ upper bounded by " < 0:5, to select a
reputable provider for the next transaction.
Consider any rational provider with N services to sell. Let u  ui  u; i D
1; : : : ; N , be the base prices of the services in the i-th transaction, as bid by the winning
provider in the reverse auction. Suppose that the pricing model P.; f / is used by the
client, and it follows that
(i) If the identity cost  is small, the following identity premium ensures that honest
behavior is always the best response strategy of the provider in any transaction i D
1; : : : ; N  1, for any 0 < i < 1:
f .L/ D
LX
iD1
Li .ui .1  i /  =/ for L > 0: (2)
(ii) For  ¤ 1, let us consider the case of no competition among providers, where the base
price ui can be assumed as a unit cost: ui D 1 and i D ; i D 1; : : : ; N . If the
identity cost  < 0 D .1  /, the following identity premium function is sufficient
to enforce honesty for a provider in selling all but the last service:
f .L/ D ..1  /  =/ 1  
L
1   for L > 0: (3)
With ui D 1; i D ; i D 1; : : : ; N , and for  D 1, the identity premium is
f .L/ D L.1    =/ for L > 0: (4)
(iii) Let Nh be the number of transactions that a fully cooperative (honest) provider can par-
ticipate in till it is mistakenly blacklisted, and let Nc be the number of bad transactions
an intentionally malicious provider can benefit from defecting until being eliminated
from the system. We have EŒNh > 1="k and EŒNc < 1=.1  "/k .
The results (i,ii,iii) hold even in presence of strategic manipulation of ratings by agents.
The f .L/ defined in Theorem 1 determines the additional amount the client must pay
to motivate the provider. This additional cost of the client to motivate honesty of rational
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providers in the system is an inevitable cost in any open system with cheap identities, as
proven by Friedman and Resnick (2001).
Apparently, a smaller identity premium f .L/ results in lower prices and thus is more
encouraging to the clients. A provider, on the other hand, must sell its first service at a
low price to gain the identity premium and is compensated by selling other services in
future transactions at higher prices. If providers have many services to sell, eventually, they
would be able to sell their services at very high price thanks to their accumulated iden-
tity premiums. As from (3), small values of  D 
.1"/k"k < 1 are preferable, because
the prices with premium are not becoming extremely high and thus still acceptable to the
clients. In Sections 4.4 and 4.5, we will investigate the different options of rational agents
(clients/providers) and identify those conditions under which it is still beneficial for them to
accept such an identity premium-based pricing approach.
The service price ad infinitum, determined by the identity premium, is strongly depen-
dent on the relative cheating gain ratio . This  is decided by the characteristics of the
marketplace, namely the additional cheating gain in a transaction 0 <  D gainprice  1, the
error bound " of the trust mechanism being used to detect unreliable ratings and the system
threshold k to blacklist ill-behaved providers.
For   1, the price of services ad infinitum cannot be bounded and depends on the
number of services the provider wants to sell during its whole lifetime. For  < 1, it is
possible to use an identity premium so that the price ad infinitum L ! 1 is bounded
as follows. If ui D 1; i D 1; : : : ; N , as in item (ii) of Theorem 1, it is clear that
limL!1 f .L/ D .1/=1 . Thus, given "; k;  such that  < 1, we can easily find the
initial price 1   such that at infinity, the identity premium-based service price reaches the
standard price ui D 1. In fact,
1   C .1  /  =
1   D 1 , 1   D 1   C =: (5)
We can also obtain a similar result for the case where ui ’s are different by using the fact
that ui  u; i D 1; : : : ; N , letting i D  and considering the following alternative for
the identity premium in (2):
f .L/ D u.1  /  = LX
iD1
Li D u.1  /  = 1  L
1   : (6)
Under the identity premium described in equation (6), if  < 1, the price determined
by the identity premium of a provider can be understood as the price a client is willing to
pay given its estimate of the defection probability of the provider. This can be shown by
rewriting the price P.; f / as
P.; f / D u.1  / C f .L/ D u

1 

  f .L/
u

:
As limL!1 f .L/u D u
.1/=
u.1/ , the term   f .L/u can be seen as a probability iff
0 <   f .L/
u
 1 , lim
L!1
f .L/
u
  ,   1 

u
1 C u.1/
u
D min:
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By seeing the price uŒ1  .  f .L/
u
/ of the service in a transaction as an average price
based on the probability of defection by the provider, this probability could be estimated as
  f .L/=u. Thus, the longer a provider stays in the system, the smaller this probability of
defection becomes, and the closer the price reaches the standard price u of the service.
Figure 2(a) and (b) shows the identity premium-based prices for different values of the
relative cheating gain ratio  by a provider. The result is shown with the standard price
u D 1 for a service, the initial price 1   D 0:5 (half of the standard one) and the
dishonesty detection mechanism setting " D 0:1; k D 3. The identity cost is set at  D 0=2.
As shown in Figure 2(a), the identity premium price is bounded and reasonably small for
 < 1. For   1, in Figure 2(b), the price reaches high values very rapidly, which means an
identity premium-based pricing model is not an option for systems with very high temporary
cheating gains  for rational providers. Further analysis (not given here) also shows that the
starting price 1   and the identity cost  do not have significant influence to the price if
 > 1. With small  < 1, where our premium approach is acceptable to clients, a higher
identity cost  does help to adjust the price with identity premium considerably.
The effect of the error bound " of the dishonesty detector to the identity premium-based
price is given in Figure 3(a) and (b), for an example case with u D 1,  D 0:5,  D 0:5 and
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FIGURE 2. The identity premium-based price with different relative cheating gain ratios (a)  < 1 and (b)
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FIGURE 3. The identity premium-based prices with different " and k such that  < 1 (a) and  > 1 (b)
compared to the standard price u D 1. The case  D 1 was already shown in Figure 2(b).
COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
 D 0=2. It is observed that the smaller the " (the more effective the dishonesty detection),
the smaller the  becomes and the lower the price with identity premium. Given a specific
 , higher values of " or k may result in   1 and thus are not preferable. Thus, for each
application-dependent setting  , there is an upper bound of the misclassification error " of
the computational trust model used to implement the dishonesty detector, with which the
identity premium is bounded and still acceptable to the clients.
A thorough analysis of the effect of the intentionally malicious providers to the honesty
among participants is out of the scope of this article. Nevertheless, this effect is quanti-
fied by claim (iii) of Theorem 1: In a system using a dishonesty detector with a small error
bound ", an intentionally malicious provider can only cheat for a limited number of trans-
actions with one identity. On the other hand, fully cooperative providers are less likely to be
mistakenly blacklisted and thus can use the same identity for many transactions. Figure 4
shows the possibility of correctly eliminating the malicious providers and wrongly black-
listing the honest ones versus different " and k for  D 1. It is observed that the higher
the accuracy of the computational trust model being used (lower "), the lower the prob-
ability that an honest provider is accidentally blacklisted (higher EŒNh) and the higher
the probability that malicious providers are eliminated from the system (lower EŒNc).
Higher thresholds k reduce the possibilities of wrongly blacklisting honest providers yet
also increase the survival chance of intentionally malicious providers. Hence, given a known
", it is recommended to choose appropriate k values given the prior information on environ-
ment vulnerability. In environments with more malicious behaviors, it is better for rational
clients to choose smaller k values to eliminate bad providers quickly, at the cost of ignor-
ing good providers. In less-vulnerable environments with mostly good providers, a higher k
is recommended. Note that the given trends are for the worst-case scenario in an extremely
vulnerable environment, where an honest provider is repeatedly badmouthed by other users
and a malicious provider has enough resources for disguising its cheating activities by post-
ing many positive ratings to the system consecutively. As we consider only a few of these
irrationally malicious providers, the honesty level in the system should not be significantly
affected. Of course, the system is still vulnerable to the attacks by several intentionally mali-
cious providers that join the system with new identities and continuously defect to destroy
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the system reputation. These attacks cannot be prevented, yet one may consider that these
intentionally malicious providers may have only limited resources, and thus, the impact of
these bad providers may be quantified in relation with this cost limitation.
4.4. System Inefficiency and Incentives of Providers to Accept an Identity Premium-based
Pricing Mechanism
A key issue in the application of our identity premium-based approach in practice is the
acceptance of the participants. Toward this answer, we will first analyze from the perspective
of a provider its rational incentive to accept an identity premium approach.
Under the pricing scheme P.; f /, a new provider must sell a service at an initial low
price and then gain premiums over time to compensate for its previous losses. It is important
to understand whether a provider may gain or lose significantly from such a pricing scheme.
Compared to an ideal case where a provider may sell each of its services at a competing
price, the additional benefit g.N / that the pricing scheme P.; f / gives a provider with N
services to sell is defined as
g.N / D
NX
iD1
Œui .1  i / C f .i  1/ 
NX
iD1
ui D
NX
iD1
.f .i  1/  uii / (7)
where u  ui  u is the base price of the service sold in the i-th transaction (the winning
price of the auction), i is the parameter deciding the initial price at zero identity premium
and f .i/ is the identity premium of the i-th transaction.
Depending on the nature of the problem and the sequence of services sold by a provider,
the total gain g.N / of the provider from its identity premium can be positive or negative. If
g.N / > 0, in the current system, clients pay higher prices for services compared to a system
without an identity premium-based pricing mechanism. As a result, higher values of g.N /
may deter clients from participating in the system, as services are generally more expensive.
However, as in the subsequent analysis, the case g.N / > 0 might still be acceptable to
clients as their risk is reduced. On the other hand, if g.N / < 0, providers must accept selling
services at lower prices compared to normal systems where no identity premium are used.
Negative values of g.N / may deter participation of providers because they generally have
less revenue.
Collectively, the average gain g.N / reflects the inefficiency of the system using an
identity premium-based pricing scheme P.; f /. This inefficiency strongly affects the
incentives of participation of clients and providers. g.N / is the cost inherent to the cheap
identity issue, which we will try to minimize by finding the optimal system design param-
eters, e.g., i , given other fixed, domain-dependent variables, including the base service
prices ui ’s and the cheating gain ratio  .
Theorem 1 puts a requirement on the shape of the identity premium function f .:/, yet it
places no special requirements on the parameter  that decides the initial price of a service.
Therefore, we would try to find an optimal value of  that determines the initial service
price so that the inefficiency of the system is as small as possible.
Theorem 2. Consider a simple case where providers sell services at the same base price of
1. We have the following:
 With  ¤ 1, for any provider with N services to sell and N is known, the identity
premium-based pricing mechanism has no inefficiency to the system with regard to this
provider, i.e., g.N / D 0, if the initial price is set at 1  , where
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 D

N  N C N  1 .  =/
NC1  .N C 1/ C N : (8)
 If providers have a large but unknown number of services to sell and  < 1, because of
the asymmetry of information between providers and clients, the identity premium-based
pricing mechanism has a small bounded inefficiency of =
1 to each provider if the
initial price for a service approximates 1   C = .
Proof . For  ¤ 1; ui D 1; i D 1; : : : ; N , the identity premium function is given by
f .L/ D ..1  /  =/1  
L
1   : (9)
The inefficiency of the pricing mechanism to the provider is
g.N / D
NX
iD1
.f .i  1/  / D
NX
iD1

..1  /  =/1  
i1
1    

(10)
D

N  N C N  1 .  =/   NC1  .N C 1/ C N 
.1  /2 (11)
g.N / D 0 ,  D

N  N C N  1 .  =/
NC1  .N C 1/ C N D
A
B
: (12)
It can be verified for any  > 0 and A  B < 0.
Therefore, with any  > 0, from (12), we always have 0 <  < 1.
For very large N and unknown to clients and  < 1, any client can estimate the optimal
setting  ! 2CC==
1 D   = ; thus, a client accepts to buy service from a
provider at an initial price 1   C = . The price ad infinitum in this case is .1  =/.1 C
==.1/. With this specific setting, the inefficiency of each provider is limN!1 g.N / D
 limN!1 .=/.
N NC1C1/
.1/2 D 
=
1 . 
In applications where   1, it is apparent that providers have no objection to an iden-
tity premium approach: Providers can sell services at very high prices compared to the
standard values in latter transactions and therefore gain much higher benefits. Therefore,
we only need to consider the incentives of rational providers to accept an identity premium-
based pricing approach in the nontrivial case  < 1. Our conjecture is that the providers
will still be better off accepting such an approach, for the following reason: In a system not
using identity premium, where all participants are fully rational and several Nash equilib-
ria may coexist (Huang, Whalley and Zhang 2013), the system may converge to the worst
Nash equilibrium, because providers would always cheat, and therefore, no client buys any
service from any provider. As a result, a rational provider would gain nothing from selling
its services. On the other hand, given a system using an identity premium pricing model
with  < 1, even though initially providers have to sell service under standard price, it is
still beneficial for providers. However, more detailed analysis and experiments have to be
carried out to confirm or reject this conjecture in future work.
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FIGURE 5. The loss of a provider given an identity premium-based pricing model versus the dishonesty
detection error bound " (k D 3) at different values of (a)  and (b) .
According to Theorem 2, Figure 5(a) shows the loss of a rational provider that sells
infinitely many services (with the standard price of each service u D 1) versus the error
bound " of the dishonesty detection mechanism (the effectiveness of the trust measure being
used). This loss is merely due to the information asymmetry between providers and clients:
The number of services of a provider is unknown to client. We consider a representative
case with a zero identity cost  D 0 and k D 3. First, we observe that for an application
with a given  , there is an upper bound of " so that  < 1, and thus, the price ad infinitum
is upper bounded and small. For smaller temporary cheating gains  , this upper bound is
higher, and thus, the system is more error tolerant in identifying malicious ratings. Second,
it is apparent that the higher the effectiveness of the trust mechanism used (lower ") and
the lower the temporary cheating gain  , the lower the loss of the provider (compared to
the service price of 1). For example, at " D 0:25 and  D 0:25, the provider’s loss is
approximately 1:5, i.e., if the provider participates in many transactions, its loss due to
our pricing mechanism, termed the social cost of cheap pseudonyms as in Friedman and
Resnick (2001), is 1:5 of the price of a single service. This loss is in fact very small and
well acceptable to the provider, compared to the potential loss of the provider in a system
with no identity premium, where rational clients distrust and do not buy any of its services.
Figure 5(b) shows a similar trend in the relation between the provider’s loss and the relative
cheating gain ratio  < 1. In general, a rational provider will find good incentives to accept
the price model with an identity premium concept, because its loss due to selling service at
smaller prices upon joining the system will be almost compensated in its later transactions.
It is worth noting that there may be many factors or unavoidable circumstances
(for instance, where the transportation company made a mistake) causing an honest nega-
tive rating of a provider. This may cause the provider to be blacklisted and force the provider
to create a new identity and go through the initial cost of establishing this identity. In con-
sequence, this may change the incentives for a provider to accept our identity premium
mechanism. We have shown in our previous work (Vu and Aberer 2011) that honest negative
ratings due to unavoidable circumstances have only minor impact on providers.
4.5. Incentives of Rational Clients to Accept Identity Premium
As shown during the previous analysis, for those applications where  < 1, the identity
premium-based service price ad infinitum is bounded. Furthermore, the initial price can
be set such that at infinity, the price with identity premium is close to the standard base
price u. This means rational agents, as potential clients, would be willing to accept such a
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pricing approach. For scenarios with  > 1 and where providers may sell a limited number
of services, as claimed in Theorem 2(i), it may still be possible to set the initial price such
that there are no advantages to providers. That means, in average, agents as clients for many
transactions still find incentives in joining the system.
Another reason why agents, as clients, may accept the identity premium-based approach
comes from the observation that in general, clients are risk sensitive and favor systems with
lower transactional risks. Let us compare the risk of clients when participating in two sys-
tems: the first one with an identity premium-based pricing scheme and the second without
such a mechanism. By convention, the risk of a client in buying a service with a price p and
with a probability c that the provider cheats in the transaction is defined as pc.
We consider the following two cases, the first case is when the providers sell infinitely
many services. According to Theorem 1, the probability that a provider (in a system using
an identity premium) cheats in any transaction is zero. Thus, the risk of a client when par-
ticipating in a system with identity premium-based pricing is also zero, irrespective of the
price of the service. This is true for every client in any transaction and for any  > 0.
In the second case, suppose that each provider sells a limited number of services and
the distribution of the number of services N of providers is a known cumulative distribution
function F.N/. From Theorem 1, in a system where the service price is determined based
on a provider’s identity premium, a rational provider would only defect in selling the very
last service. Consider the transaction on a service with the base service price u1 offered by
an opportunistic provider that has finished L transactions. The probability that the provider
defects would be the probability that this provider has no more services to offer after the
current transaction, which is c D F.L/  F.L  1/. The risk of the client in transacting
with this provider is thus
risk1.u1; L/ D u1

1   C f .L/
u1

.F.L/  F.L  1//:
In a system without identity premium and with cheap identities, let m; 0  m  1,
be the general whitewashing intention of an opportunistic provider. The parameter m may
represent the malicious turnover rate of these rational participants, or the probability that
they defect and switch identities when an effective identity management scheme has not
been implemented. Let the base service price a provider offers to its clients be u2; then, it
is reasonable to assume that u2 > u1, because in a system where providers have no identity
premium, they have no reason to offer a price lower than what they can afford. All other
factors (such as the rationality of the provider and its malicious intention) being equal, the
risk of the client in doing the current transaction in a system without any identity premium is
risk2.u2; L/ D u2m:
To analyze the potential benefits of the clients in accepting an identity premium-based
pricing model, we compare risk1.u1; L/ and risk2.u2; L/ with respect to different values
of  and m. In a special case where the number of services sold by providers is uniformly
distributed in Œ1; N , we have
risk1.u1; L/ D u1

1   C f .L/
u1

1
N  1:
As proven in Section 4.3, for  < 1 and   min D 1

u
1C u.1/
u
, it is apparent that
1   C f .L/
u1
< 1. Therefore with any L > 0, we have risk1.u1; L/ < risk2.u2; L/ if
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FIGURE 6. The maximal number of services sold by providers N for different  with which risk-sensitive
clients find an identity premium-based price model a better option. The relation is plotted with varied prob-
abilities of detection m by providers and with (a) u2=u1 D 1 and  D 0:9 and (b) u2=u1 D 2 and
 D 0:9.
m.N  1/ > u1=u2. In other words, for  < 1, the system with identity premium is better
for the clients as the risk of being cheated is smaller in most cases with sufficiently high N
(because u1=u2 < 1).
For  > 1, as f .L/ D u1.1  /L11 , one can verify that the inequality
risk1.u1; L/ < risk2.u2; L/ always holds provided that

N  1  C 1
  1 <
u2m.N  1/
u1.1  / :
Figure 6(a) and (b) shows the relation between the relative cheating gain ratio  and the
maximal number of services sold by providersN with which a identity premium-based price
model is a better choice for risk-sensitive clients. It is observed that for  > 1, the identity
premium-based approach may still be less risky and preferable to clients if the providers only
sell a small number of services N and the whitewashing intention m is sufficiently high.
In summary, a system with identity premium is acceptable for rational clients in terms
of minimizing their risks in those application scenarios with low temporary cheating gain by
providers such that the system parameter  < 1. In the case of  > 1, the mechanism is still
acceptable for clients if clients buy many services from several providers and providers sell
a small, limited numbers of services, such that the service price does not become very high.
In case these numbers can be estimated, the initial service price can even be set appropriately
to minimize the (dis)advantages of each provider, as claimed in Theorem 2.
For example, in an eBay-like system, cheating means that the provider (seller) may gain
the whole price paid to the sold article; thus,  D 1 and  D 1=..1  "/k  "k/ > 1 for
any k > 0; " < 0:5. This means that a completely open (i.e., with cheap identities) and
decentralized version of an eBay-like system is only practical if the providers sell a small
number of articles of bounded prices and if in any transaction, a buyer accepts the risk of
being cheated by an opportunistic seller with no more items to sell after the current transac-
tion. In another example of service provisioning where providing bad services has a lower
but nonzero value to the client, it is acceptable to assume that  < 1. Given the availability
of a sufficiently accurate trust modeling mechanism with small " and with appropriate k, it
is still possible that  < 1, and thus, an identity premium-based pricing model is readily
applicable and accepted by the participants.
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5. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
In this section, we discuss possible issues related to the implementation of the provider
selection protocol in Definition 3, which uses an identity premium.
5.1. Implementation of Identity Premium
Our identity premium-based incentive mechanism is actually an alternative decen-
tralized implementation of the popular solution of using entrance cost for newcomers to
prevent whitewashing behavior. The identity premium can be implemented in different ways
depending on the characteristics of the marketplaces. First of all, such a premium can
be given to long-staying providers by modifying the matchmaking between providers and
clients such that well-established providers are introduced to more clients for their future
transactions. This approach is feasible in case providers sell nondepleted services, i.e., one
service can be used for potentially many different clients. For example, this applies when
providers are professional sellers of many similar articles, and being matched with more
clients means higher revenues for the providers. Second, in case of depletable services, pric-
ing mechanism can be implemented directly by regulation: Providers may sell services at
higher prices. A potential approach to be investigated further is the combination of the iden-
tity premium with the traditional use of reputation: We consider the identity premium f .L/
as credit points exchangeable with real money. Those credit points of a provider act as its
reputation image, helping it to be selected by more clients. In the case of many providers in
the system, this reputation image is much more important to the provider than real money
obtained from a transaction, i.e., the provider would accept to sell services at normal price
but with higher probability of being selected by future consumers.
5.2. Implementation of a Dishonesty Detector
In our system, a dishonesty detector can be implemented with a reputation-based com-
putational trust model, which uses statistical or heuristic methods to learn the behavior of
an agent (the target) from several information sources. The first source comes from the per-
formance statistics of the target in past transactions. These statistics are possibly collected
from recommendations/ratings by previous partners and from personal experience of the
learning peer on the target. Other information includes intrinsic features of the target itself,
e.g., frequencies of posted ratings and involved transactions, location of the raters (Cornelli
et al. 2002) and relationships with other agents (Ashri et al. 2005). The behavior we want to
learn from a computational trust model in this case is the rating behavior of an agent, i.e.,
whether a client truthfully reports its experience. In centralized systems where the dishon-
esty detector is implemented and deployed centrally and completely trusted, the verifiability
of a dishonesty detection is not necessary. In decentralized systems, a verifiable dishonesty
detector can be implemented with a global computational trust model, such as EigenTrust
(Kamvar, Schlosser, and Molina 2003) or complaint based (Aberer and Despotovic 2001).
More generally, the verification of the dishonesty detection can be performed by disclosing
the relevant information a client has used in the evaluation of a rating on a provider, possibly
in an easy-to-validate form such as a proof-carrying code (Necula 1997).
We here provide more details about some other typical examples of the computational
trust models that can serve the purpose of a dishonesty detector. The Beta Reputation Sys-
tem (Whitby, Jøsang, and Indulska 2005) adopts an Iterated Filtering Approach to detect
or filter out the ratings to a seller that are not among the majority. TRAVOS (Teacy et al.
2005) models the trustworthiness of agents that share ratings (raters), based on whether or
not the past ratings given by the agents lead the client agent to successful transactions with
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service providers. The personalized approach (Zhang, Sensoy, and Cohen 2008) allows a
client to model the trustworthiness of a rater by comparing the client’s ratings and the rater’s
ratings to commonly rated providers, as well as the rater’s ratings and all other clients’ rat-
ings to the same providers. Both the SALE POMDP model (Oliehoek, Gokhale, and Zhang
2012) and the evolutionary trust model (Jiang, Zhang, and Ong 2013) allow a client a to ask
another client b about b’s trust assessment on a rater and, at the same time, take into account
the trustworthiness of client b. The trust model (Fang, Zhang, and Thalmann 2013) derived
from the diffusion theory makes use of social proximity between the client and the rater to
evaluate the trustworthiness of the rater. In a social network, if the rater is socially closer to
the client, the client will have higher trust toward the rater.
Zhang et al. (2008) performed extensive experiments to compare the performance of
several probabilistic approaches (Beta Reputation System, TRAVOS, and their own per-
sonalized approach) in detecting unfair ratings. The misclassification error bounds of these
reputation-based probabilistic trust models are well lower than 0:5 even under various adap-
tively malicious attacks by participating raters. Other empirical experimental results (Vu and
Aberer 2011) have confirmed that other computational trust models, such as those proposed
by Xiong and Liu (2004), are also capable of classifying unreliable ratings with a small error
bound " under various attack scenarios, and thus, they can be readily used to implement a
dishonesty detector.
Another accurate yet expensive approach to dishonesty detection is to monitor the
provider’s performance to learn its actual past behavior to compare with the present ratings.
For example, in e-commerce applications, this monitoring can be performed via legal inves-
tigations on suspicious transactions. In a market of Web services, monitoring agents can
periodically probe the service and measure the real performance level offered by a provider
to its clients.
In summary, methods to implement the dishonesty detector and identity premium for
providers are available in most practical (decentralized) service provision systems. Given
these building primitives, the implementation of any identity premium and reputation-
aware provider selection protocol such as the one presented in this article is realistic
and achievable.
6. CONCLUSION
In this, article we have proposed a solution to prevent whitewashing attacks and incen-
tivize honesty in open and decentralized reputation systems where cheap identities are
available. We analyze the possibility of using a computational trust model with a given
capability of identifying unreliable and biased ratings to effectively eliminate malicious
providers and to enforce honesty of rational ones, given that the providers can change their
identities at a small cost to avoid any punishment imposed by the community. The key to
creating incentives for honesty in these environments is an identity premium-based price
model, where well-established providers are given advantages over new ones in pricing their
services. Such an identity premium-based pricing approach can also cope with the sparsity
of ratings. The fact that providers stay in the system after a number of transactions already
proves its capability of high-quality service provision to consumers.
Because an identity premium-based price model relies directly on the acceptance of both
service clients and providers, we have also analyzed the risk imposed to the clients and the
potential losses caused by the use of identity premium. We have quantified the inefficiency
of the system in relation with the identity cost and the characteristics of the marketplace
under study. As a result, we have also identified those application settings that make such
a pricing mechanism realistic and acceptable for both service clients and providers. Given
COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
a computational trust model with a reasonably low misclassification error when detecting
unreliable ratings and in the case where the temporary cheating gain by providers is small,
it is proven that rational clients can select the providers and determine the service prices
such that intentionally malicious providers are quickly eliminated and rational providers
are motivated to cooperate in all but the last transaction, even if it is possible for them to
whitewash any bad reputation.
The current work is inspired by our previous work (Vu and Aberer 2011). More specif-
ically, in the previous work, identities are assumed to be costly, and the provider selection
protocol in Definition 3 can simply assure that any rational provider is motivated to coop-
erate in all but a small number of its last transactions. The current work is a further
development of the previous one by introducing identity premium for the case of cheap iden-
tities. Combining the two pieces of work together, we have proposed an effective approach
to using computational trust models to enforce honesty in the presence of any cost model
for identity.
Our analysis is limited to the case where the identity premium is only a function of the
length of stay of a provider. The main reason is that its verifiability helps us consider the
accuracy of the computational trust model being used to evaluate the rating reliability. As
a future work, this analysis may be extended to find the equilibria of user strategies under
different service pricing mechanisms that incorporate other factors such as the number of
negative and positive ratings on a provider and to quantify the efficiency and applicability
of such mechanisms. On this direction, existing mechanisms from microeconomics and
operations research may be applied, e.g., providers may sell their reputation upon quitting
the system, leading to a market of reputation (Tadelis 2002).
Another direction to explore is the distributed deployment of our model by, for example,
allowing service clients to set different values for k (the number of posted cheating detection
on a service provider) and to use different trust models (dishonesty detectors). We will
conduct simulations to validate our model in such settings and observe the correlations
between k and the accuracy of different dishonesty detectors. We will also expand our model
to allow clients to provide ratings in different scales, for example, a real value in the range of
Œ0; 1 or a multiscale rating, to obtain better estimation of the deceptive behavior of providers
(i.e.,  in Section 3).
Also, we will investigate whether our mechanism can resist various sophisticated cheat-
ing strategies (i.e., attacks) of providers. For example, a malicious provider may not have
any good to sell, but it creates new identities to game the system by announcing the low-
est price. Our system may not be able to cope with this attack. We will also continue to
experimentally verify the applicability of our mechanism in different application scenarios.
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APPENDIX A: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof. We prove (i) by considering a rational provider that has a total of N services
to sell. Suppose that the provider has finished L  1  0 transactions with the current
identity and gained a utility of U > 0. In the current L-th transaction, the provider has
an identity premium of f .L  1/. Let u  uL  u be the current service as proposed
by this provider in the reverse auction, the provider may sell the service at an adjusted
price uL.1  / C f .L  1/. We only consider the case 1  L < N , i.e., the provider
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still has  D N  L > 0 services to sell after finishing the current transaction (in the
last transaction, there is no way to enforce a full rational provider to cooperate). Denote as
U.L;/ the best (maximized) expected utilities a provider with an identity premium f .L/
may obtain for these remaining  transactions. U.0;/ thus corresponds to the case when
the provider has no identity premium, e.g., a newly joined provider or a provider that just
left and then rejoined under a new identity. Note that it costs the provider an amount  to
create an identity.
Let 0  t; a; b; i  1, where t C a C b C i D 1, respectively be the probabilities that
the current client exhibits the following rating behaviors after the transaction: trustworthy
(provides a reliable rating), advertising (posts a positive rating), badmouthing (posts a neg-
ative rating), and nonparticipating (not leaving any rating, or ignorance). Note that possible
strategic rating manipulations by any raters colluding with the current provider are all con-
sidered by these probabilities. For example, consider the case where the provider may use
a fake identity to stuff a positive rating with a newer time stamp to hide its cheating in a
transaction. In this case, the provider still has an additional gain v in the transaction, and
the dishonesty detection is applied on the fake rating by a client exhibiting an advertising
behavior, i.e., t D i D b D 0; a D 1.
The probabilities that an honest provider obtains a positive (negative) rating after a
transaction are hC D t C a C i D 1  b .1  hC/. The honest provider is blacklisted
if the genuine positive rating is not accepted by the computational trust model as reliable,
with a probability ˇ, or the biased negative rating is accepted as reliable with a probability
˛. Thus, the probability that the provider will be blacklisted by a forthcoming client is
xb D hCˇ C

1  hC˛ D .1  b/ˇ C b˛  ", because 0  b  1 and 0  ˛  ",
0  ˇ  ".
The probability that the provider is globally blacklisted after the current transaction
is xk
b
 "k . This holds even in the presence of malicious or strategic manipulation
of ratings by raters with different t; a; b; i , provided that the errors ˛ and ˇ of R are
less than ".
By similar reasoning, if the provider is cheating in this transaction, the probability that
the provider is globally blacklisted is yk
b
 .1  "/k .
Note that the preceding analysis holds even in the presence of malicious or strategic
manipulation of ratings by providers, provided that misclassification errors ˛ and ˇ ofR are
less than ". A globally blacklisted provider with more services to sell has to join the system
under a new identity with a zero identity premium.
Let Uhonest (Ucheat) be the best expected lifetime utilities of the provider if it is honest
(cheating) in the current transaction, it follows that
Uhonest D U C uL.1  / C f .L  1/ C

1  xkb
	
U.L;  1/ C xkb .U.0;  1/  /
Ucheat D U C ŒuL.1  / C f .L  1/.1 C / C

1  ykb
	
U.L;  1/
C ykb .U.0;  1/  /
ıhc D Uhonest  Ucheat D  ŒuL.1  / C f .L  1/ 
C

ykb  xkb
	
.U.L;  1/  U.0;  1/ C //
 ŒuL.1  /Cf .L  1/C

.1  "/k  "k
	
.U.L;  1/  U.0;  1/ C /:
(A.1)
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Suppose that in the next transaction the provider sells another service with an original
price u0 (possibly the winning price of another reverse auction). If the provider is honest in
the next transaction, we have
U.L;  1/ D u0.1  0/ C f .L/ C

1  xkb
	
U.L C 1;  2/
C xkb .U.0;  2/  /
U.0;  1/ D u0.1  0/C

1  xkb
	
U.1;  2/ C xkb .U.0;  2/  /
U.L;  1/  U.0;  1/ D f .L/ C

1  xkb
	
.U.L C 1;  2/  U.1;  2//:
(A.2)
Similarly, if the provider defects in the next transaction,
U.L;1/U.0;1/ D f .L/C

1  ykb
	
.U.LC1;2/U.1;2//: (A.3)
From equations (A.2) and (A.3) and noting that xk
b
 "k  .1"/k  yk
b
 1, we have
U.L;  1/  U.0;  1/  f .L/f .0/
C min

1  ykb ; 1  xkb
	
.U.LC1;  2/U.1;  2//
)U.L;  1/  U.0;  1/  f .L/ C

1  ykb
	
.U.L C 1;  2/  U.1;  2//:
(A.4)
By similar reasoning, the following recurrence relations can be found for 1  i  2:
U.L C i;   i  1/  U.i;  i  1/ 

1  ykb
	
.U.L C i C 1;  i  2/
 U.i C 1;  i  2// C f .L C i/  f .i/
and U.L C ; 0/  U.  1; 0/ D f .L C /  f .  1/.
From the preceding recurrences,1 it follows that
U.L;  1/  U.0;  1/  f .L/ C
1X
iD1

1  ykb
	i
.f .L C i/  f .i//: (A.5)
Let f .L/ be a monotonically increasing function of L; then, f .L C i/  f .i/  0.
From equations (A.1) and (A.5), for any 1  L < N , where N is the total of number of
services the provider wants to sell in the system, we have
ıhc D Uhonest Ucheat  ŒuL.1/Cf .L1/ C

.1  "/k  "k
	
.f .L/C/: (A.6)
1 Rigorously, the probabilities xk
b
and yk
b
may be different in each equation, and thus, yk
b
is the largest one among these
yk
b
. However, to simplify the notation, we will ignore such differences.
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Cooperation in this (L-th) transaction is the best response strategy of the provider
whenever ıhc  0, which always holds if
f .L/  
.1  "/k  "k f .L  1/ 
uL.1  /  
.1  "/k  "k : (A.7)
Recall that  D 
.1"/k"k > 0. By similar reasoning, cooperation is the best response
strategy for the provider in all transactions 1; : : : ; L iff
f .L/  f .L  1/  uL.1  L/  =
f .L  1/  f .L  2/  uL1.1  L1/  =
: : :
f .2/  f .1/  u2.1  2/  =
f .1/  u1.1  1/  =; where f .0/ D 0
) f .L/ 
LX
iD1
Li .ui .1  i /  =/:
The following minimal identity premium function satisfies every preceding constraint:
f .L/ D
LX
iD1
Li .ui .1  i /  =/: (A.8)
Let  be the largest among i ; i D 1; : : : ; L, and note that ui  u; i D 1; : : : ; L;
we have
f .L/  f .L  1/ D uL.1  L/ C .  1/
L1X
iD1
Liui .1  i /  =L1
 u

1   C .  1/ L1X
iD1
Liu

1    =L1
D u

1  L  =L1 > 0
,  < 0 D u

1   :
(A.9)
One may verify that the inequality (A.9) holds for both cases of  ¤ 1 and  D 1. In
other words, f .L/ is an increasing function of L with any  < 0, and thus, the requirement
f .L C i/ > f .i/ in (A.5) is met. Therefore, with the identity premium of (2) and where
0 < " < 0:5, cooperation is always the best response strategy of a rational provider in any
transaction after which it still has  D N L > 0 services to sell. That means the provider
is motivated to cooperate at every transaction L D 1; : : : ; N  1, and thus, (i) is proven. For
the simple case with ui D 1; i D ; i D 1; : : : ; N , we find that (ii) follows immediately.
To prove (iii), note that after each transaction, the probability that by accident, an honest
provider is globally blacklisted is xk
b
 "k . In the worst case ever, Nh is a geometric random
variable with probability "k; hence, EŒNh > 1="k .
By similar reasoning, the probability that a malicious provider is globally blacklisted is
yk
b
 .1  "/k , and thus, EŒNc < 1=.1  "/k .
